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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
I.

Issues
1.

Did the district court mistakenly refuse to make

Mr. Blaine's increased child support obligations retroactive
to when he received notice of the Petition for Modification
on the basis of a misinterpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 7845-7.2 (6) (1953 as amended)?
2.

Did the district court improperly refuse to

restore to Ms. Bradshaw, as the custodial parent, the tax
dependency exemption for the parties' minor child without
making any factual findings, although the parties stipulated
that a legally sufficient change in their circumstances
required that there be a modification of their existing
order?

II.

Standard of Review
There are no disputed facts in this case.

Because Ms.

Bradshaw accepts the district court's findings of facts and
challenges only the lower court's legal conclusions, this
court should review the decision below for correctness and
should afford no deference to the district court's
conclusions.

Whitehead v. Whitehead, 836 P.2d 814 (Utah

App. 1992); Smith v. Smith. 793 P.2d 407, 409 (Utah App.

2

1990).

A determination, based on stipulated facts, of

whether there are sufficient grounds to modify an award of a
tax dependency exemption is a legal conclusion subject to
full review by this Court.
Although a decision to make an increase in child
support retroactive is a matter of discretion to be
exercised by a trial court, the trial court must make
appropriate and adequate findings to support its conclusion•
Accordingly, this Court should review the order concerning
retroactivity for abuse of discretion and should determine
the adequacy of the findings to support the trial court7s
exercise of discretion.

Hill v. Hill. 841 P.2d 722 (Utah

App. 1992); Motes v. Motes. 786 P.2d 232 (Utah App. 1989);
Jefferies v. Jefferies. 752 P.2d 909, 911-12 (Utah App.
1988).
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The statutory provisions determinative in this action
are:
Utah Code Annotated § 30-3-5 (3) (1953 as amended)•
The court has continuing jurisdiction to make
subsequent changes or new orders for the support
and maintenance of the parties, the custody of the
children and their support, maintenance, health,
and dental care, or the distribution of property
as is reasonable and necessary.
Utah Code Annotated § 30-3-10.6 (2) (1953 as amended).
A child or spousal support payment under a child
support order may be modified with respect to any
period during which a petition for modification is
pending, but only from the date notice of that
petition was given to the obligee, if the obligor
is the petitioner, or to the obligor, if the
obligee is the petitioner.
Utah Code Annotated § 78-45-7.2 (6) (1953 as amended).
With regard to child support orders, enactment of
the guidelines and any subsequent change in the
guidelines constitutes a substantial or material
change of circumstances as a ground for
modification of a court order, if there is a
difference of at least 25% between the existing
order and the guidelines . . . .

STATEMENT OP THE CASE
I.

Nature of the Case
The interpretation of two Utah statutory provisions lie

at the heart of this case:

Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-45-7.2 and

30-3-10.6 (2). Initially, this Court must construe Utah

4

Code Ann. § 78-45-7.2 (6) (1953 as amended), which declares
that a 25% difference between an existing order for child
support and the amount prescribed by the guidelines will
establish a substantial change of circumstances as a ground
for modification of the existing order.

While this

provision asserts that the 25% figure is a sufficient basis
for modification of an existing support order, the trial
court concluded that a 25% difference is necessary for a
modification —

that in the absence of a 25% change between

an existing child support obligation and the obligation
determined under guidelines, there is no change in
circumstances substantial enough to warrant a modification
of the existing order.

At the onset, this court must

determine the validity of the trial court's reading of Utah
Code Ann. § 78-45-7.2 (6).
Secondly, this court must determine what findings a
trial court must make before it can refuse to modify an
existing court order to award the custodial parent a tax
dependency exemption.

Although the parties in this case

stipulated that a substantial change in circumstances
warranted an increase in Mr. Blaine's child support
obligations, the trial court failed to give a basis for its
decision that there was not a sufficient change to warrant
altering the portion of the existing decree which awarded to
5

Mr* Blaine the right to claim the tax dependency exemption.
This Court must determine whether this decision can be
appropriately made by the trial court without any factual
findings.

A copy of the original 1986 decree is attached as

Exhibit "Eff.

II.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below
On April 22, 1991, Ms, Bradshaw served Mr. Blaine with

a Petition for Modification, (Exhibit "A"), which maintained
that a substantial change of circumstances, not contemplated
in the original divorce decree, necessitated a modification
of the decree.

Subsequently, on May 19, 1992, Ms. Bradshaw

filed a Supplemental Petition to Modify the divorce decree.
Exhibit "AA".

Both of these petitions were heard on

September 3, 1992, by the Honorable Anne Stirba, Third
Judicial District Court Judge.

On the facts stipulated to

by the parties, Judge Stirba granted in part and denied in
part Ms. Bradshaw's petitions.

The trial court's ruling

were embodied in the Amended Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, (Exhibit "B" attached), and an Order and
Judgment, (Exhibit "C" attached), dated October 21, 1992 and
October 19, 1992, respectively.
Ms. Bradshaw now appeals the portions of Judge Stirba's
decision and order which:
6

(1)

denied her request to order Mr. Blaine to pay

increased child support as of the date he was served with
the Petition for Modification (April 22, 1991), and
(2)

denied her request to award her, as the custodial

parent, the right to claim the child Allison as a dependent
for the purposes of an income tax exemption.
Ms. Bradshaw's notice of appeal was dated October 30,
1992 and was timely filed.

III.

Statement of Facts
The pertinent facts regarding Ms. Bradshaw's petitions

for modification, (Exhibits "A11 & "AA" attached) , were
uncontested and were stipulated to by the parties.

These

facts are recited in the Amended Findings of Fact signed by
the trial court.

(Exhibit "B" attached).

Those undisputed

facts are:
1.

The parties were divorced in 1986 when plaintiff/

appellee, David Blaine ("Mr. Blaine") was a full time
college student and his income was less than eight hundred
dollars (<$800.00) per month.

Ms. Bradshaw was employed

full time as a school teacher at that time.

Amended

Findings, 5 1, Exhibit "B" attached.
2.

Since the divorce Mr. Blaine has completed his

college education and is now employed full time by IBM in
7

New York State earning three thousand eighty-one dollars
($3,081.00) per month.

Amended Findings, J 2, Exhibit flBlf

attached.
3.

Ms. Bradshaw currently earns one thousand sixty-

five dollars ($1,065.00) per month working half time as a
public school teacher.

Amended Findings, 5 3, Exhibit "B"

attached.
4.

Allison, the child of the parties, was three (3)

years old when the divorce occurred and is now nine (9)
years of age.

The cost of caring for a nine (9) year old

child today is greater than for caring for a three (3) year
old child six years ago.

Amended Findings, f 4, Exhibit "B"

attached.
5.

The original decree entered May 2, 1986 provided

that Mr. Blaine would pay a maximum of two hundred and fifty
dollars ($250.00) per month in child support when his income
exceeded one thousand two hundred and fifty dollars
($1,250.00+) per month.

The original decree had provisions

for escalation of child support as Mr. Blaine/s income
increased, but contained no provision for escalation after
plaintiff's income substantially exceeded one thousand two
hundred and fifty dollars ($1,250.00+) per month.
Findings, 5 5, Exhibit "B" attached.
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Amended

6.

The original decree provided that for the years

1986 - 1989 inclusive Ms. Bradshaw could claim Allison as a
dependent and receive an exemption for income tax purposes.
The original decree and existing order provided that for the
year 1990 and each year thereafter Mr. Blaine could claim
Allison as a dependent and receive an exemption for income
tax purposes. When the decree was entered the parties
anticipated that in 1990 Mr. Blaine would be earning more
than Ms. Bradshaw and that at that time he would have
greater use for the tax dependency exemption.

Amended

Findings, 5 6, Exhibit "B" attached.
7.

Mr. Blaine was served with the petition for

modification on April 22, 1991. Amended Findings, 5 8,
Exhibit "B" attached.
8.

In April, 1991 Mr. Blaine was earning only two

thousand eight hundred fifty-two dollars ($2,852.00) gross
monthly salary working for IBM.

In April, 1991 Ms. Bradshaw

was earning one thousand eight hundred seventy-three dollars
($1,873.00) gross per month working full-time as a school
teacher.
9.

Amended Findings, 1 9, Exhibit "B" attached.
Under the statutory support guidelines, in April,

1991, Mr. Blaine's child support obligation to the Ms.
Bradshaw, if then recalculated, would have been two hundred
ninety-five dollars ($295.00) per month.
9

This sum

represents less than a twenty-five percent (<25%) increase
in Mr. Blaine7s support obligation under the guidelines from
the existing court order ($250.00) which was in effect in
April 1991. Amended Findings, 5 10, Exhibit "B" attached.
10.

On or about October 15, 1991, the Mr. Blaine

received an increase in his monthly gross income and since
that date has been earning three thousand eighty-one dollars
($3,081.00) gross per month.

Amended Findings, 5 11,

Exhibit "B" attached.
11.

Ms. Bradshaw claimed in her Petition to Modify

that there was a substantial change in circumstances which
allowed the trial court to reconsider and increase child
support which as well allowed the trial court to reconsider
and modify the decree with regard to which parent could
claim Allison as a dependent for income tax purposes.

The

parties agreed that there was a substantial change in
circumstances which allowed the trial court to reconsider
and increase child support.

Amended Findings, 5 13, Exhibit

"B" attached.
12.

Other than the foregoing, Ms. Bradshaw presented

no evidence to show a change in circumstances of the parties
or to justify increasing child support or altering the award
of the tax dependency exemption allowance.
Findings, 5 14, Exhibit "B" attached.
10

Amended

13.

The parties stipulated that all of the foregoing

facts were true and correct for the purpose of settlement of
certain issues and for the purpose of presentation to the
trial court of various pending legal issues as raised by the
pleadings on file. Amended Findings, f 15, Exhibit "B"
attached.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The district court made two errors when it refused to
grant portions of Ms. Bradshaw's petitions for modification
of the parties7 divorce decree.

First, the district court

misinterpreted Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.2 (6) when it
concluded that the statute prevented Mr. Blaine's obligation
to pay increased child support from being retroactive to the
date he was served with the Petition for Modification
("petition").
Section 78-45-7.2 (6) Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended),
establishes that a 25% or more difference between an
existing child support order and an obligation under Utah's
child support guidelines is sufficient —

by itself —

to

prove a substantial change in circumstances as a ground for
modification of the existing order.

Importantly, the

statute does not suggest in any way that a modification of

11

an existing order is only appropriate when this 25%
difference is present.
However, the trial court adopted this latter and
improper reading of § 78-45-7.2 (6), refusing to make Mr.
Blaine's increased child support obligations retroactive to
before October 15, 1991, simply because the 25% difference
did not then exist.

The trial court offered no other

reasoning of findings for its conclusion.

At the same time,

the trial court ignored that the parties stipulated that
three factors unrelated to the impact of the guidelines
created a substantial change in circumstances.

Because two

of these factors were in existence on the date Mr. Blaine
was served with the petition, the increase in his child
support obligation should be made retroactive to the date of
that service —

April 22, 1991.

Second, the district court failed to give any reasons
or findings to support its decision that —

although the

parties' had stipulated that a substantial change in their
circumstances warranted a modification in their existing
child support agreement —

this change did not justify

modifying the existing decree to allow Ms. Bradshaw, as the
custodial parent, to claim Allison as her dependent for the
purposes of income taxes.

This lack of appropriate findings

was improper for several reasons.
12

Because Utah's child support guidelines assume that the
tax dependency exemption is awarded the custodial parent,
allocation of the exemption to the noncustodial parent runs
contrary to the guidelines and requires explanation.
Recently, this Court held that failure to follow the
statutory child support guidelines absent findings of
special circumstances is reversible error.

Similarly, this

Court determined that both federal tax law and the best
interests of the child dictate that only when exceptional
circumstances exist can the tax exemption be awarded to the
noncustodial parent.

However, no findings were made in this

case to justify allowing Mr. Blaine to continue to claim
Allison as his dependent.

Indeed, given the stipulated

facts, the tax dependency exemption cannot be properly
awarded to the noncustodial parent.

Again, trial court

error demands the intervention of this Court to require that
the tax exemption be granted to Ms. Bradshaw as the
custodian of Allison.
Because the parties have stipulated to the facts
pertinent to this action and this Court is in as good a
position to consider these facts as was the trial court,
this Court is to draw its own legal conclusions from the
facts.

Accordingly, this Court should direct the trial

court to enter an order establishing that Mr. Blaine's child
13

support obligation should be retroactive to the date he
received notice of the petition and that, commencing with
1992, Ms. Bradshaw should be again awarded the tax
dependency exemption for Allison.

14

ARGUMENT1
I. Mr. Blaine's Increased Child Support Obligation Should
Be Made Retroactive to the Date He Received Notice of the
Petition for Modification of the Parties' Divorce Decree.
The trial court erred in denying Ms. Bradshaw's request
to make Mr. Blaine's increased child support obligation to
Allison retroactive to when he was served with the petition
(April 22, 1991).

Although the trial court has broad

discretion to determine whether a modification in support
should be retroactive, there must be adequate findings or
conclusions to support the exercise of that discretion.
Importantly, the trial court herein defended its decision
only by reference to Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.2 (6) (1953 as
amended).

However, because its analysis was based on

improper interpretation of § 78-45-7.2 (6), the trial court
necessarily failed to provide adequate findings to justify
its decision.

1

As a preliminary matter, Ms. Bradshaw wants to
clarify that she properly petitioned the trial court to
modify the parties7 divorce decree. Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5
(3) (1953 as amended) provides that a district court
granting a divorce maintains continuing jurisdiction to
modify the decree with regard to support and maintenance of
minor children.
A substantial change of circumstances of
the parties, not contemplated in the decree, justifies
modification of divorce decree. Ostler v. Ostler, 789 P.2d
713 (Utah App. 1990).
Because she was able to establish a
substantial change in her own circumstances and those of Mr.
Blaine, Ms. Bradshaw properly petitioned the Third Judicial
District Court to modify the parties' divorce decree.
15

In absence of adequate findings below and given the
stipulated facts, this court should grant Ms. Bradshaw's
request, ordering Mr. Blaine's increased child support
obligation to be retroactive to April 22, 1991.

The

parties stipulated to three factors which established
substantially changed circumstances and required
modification of their existing child support agreement.
Because two of these factors were present on April 22, 1991,
the modification of the existing decree should be made
effective as of that date.

A. The Trial Court Must Provide Adequate Findings for its
Decision Not to Make Mr. Blaine's Increased Child Support
Obligation Retroactive to April 22, 1991.
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.6 (2) (1953 as amended) grants
discretion to a trial court to make child support
modification retroactive to the date notice of petition
given to the adverse party.

However, this Court determined

in Crockett v. Crockett. 836 P.2d 818, 820 (Utah App. 1992),
that retroactive modification of a decree is at discretion
of trial court, provided the court bases its decision upon
appropriate findings. Without findings by the trial court,
the parties are in no position to assess or challenge the
trial courts decision.

Id. at 820-821; Crouse v. Crouse,

817 P.2d 836, 838 (Utah App. 1991).
16

In addition, without

factual findings and documented reasoning by the trial
court, the appellate court is unable to review the
proceedings below.

Id.; See also,

Allred v Allred, 835 P.2d

974 (Utah App. 1992) (trial court must specify in its
findings the reasons a tax exemption is not given to the
noncustodial parent); Ostler v. Ostler, 789 P.2d 713, 715
(Utah App. 1990) (trial court must enter findings of fact on
factors which constitute material issues); Motes v. Motes,
786 P.2d 232 (Utah App. 1989); Jefferies v. Jefferies. 752
P.2d 909 (Utah App. 1988).
When determining child support awards, including the
retroactive effect of any modifications of these awards, the
trial court must take into account "xnot only the needs of
the child[], but also the ability of the parents to pay.'"
Ostler v. Ostlerf 789 P.2d at 715, (quoting
Woodward, 709 P.2d 393, 394 (Utah 1985)).

Woodward v.
Again, the

failure of the trial court to make "specific findings on the
statutory factors constitutes reversible error."

Id.

Similarly, the lack of sufficient findings to explain the
trial court7s refusal to make the modification of the
parties' divorce decree retroactive to April 22, 1991,
requires the intervention of this Court.

17

E. Utah Code Ann. § 78*45-7.2 (6) (1953 as Amended) Does
Not Restrict the Authority of Courts to Modify Existing
Child Support Orders to Instances Where There Is a 25%
Difference Between the Support Determined by the Existing
Order and that Determined by the Guidelines.
The only factual finding supporting the trial courts
decision not to make Mr. Blaine's child support increase
retroactive to the date he was served with the petition was
based upon an improper reading of Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.2
(6) (1953 as amended).

Referring to § 78-45-7.2 (6), the

trial court contended:
Under the statutory support guidelines, in April,
1991, plaintiff's child support obligation to the
defendant, if then re-calculated, would have been
two hundred ninety-five dollars ($295.00) per
month. Said sum represents less than a twentyfive percent (<25%) increase in plaintiff's
support obligation under the guidelines from the
existing court order ($250.00) in effect in April
1991.
Findings, 5 10 at 4, Exhibit HB,f attached.

Clearly, the

trial court was interpreting § 78-45-7.2 (6) to mean that
only when there was at least 25% difference between an
existing child support order and an obligation calculated
under the "new" guidelines, could be the basis for a
substantial change in the parties' circumstances for the
purposes of a modification of the existing order.2

The

trial court did not explain how the factors which lead to a

2

There is no case law to support the trial court's
improper.reading of § 78-45-7.2 (6).
18

stipulation by the parties that a substantial change in
their circumstances had indeed occurred, effected its
conclusion that the increased in child support did not
require that this modification be retroactive to April 22,
1991.

Instead, the trial court relied exclusively on an

inappropriate reading of Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.2 (6)
(1953 as amended).
A careful reading of § 78-45-7.2 (6) indicates that
this section provides that the 25% figure is a sufficient
basis for modification of an existing support order.

The

statute in no way mandates that a 25% difference is
necessary for a modification.

Under § 78-45-7.2 (6), the

trial court remains free to find a substantial change in
circumstances on the basis of factors other than the impact
of the guidelines on a calculation of child support —

the

25% is "a ground for modification of a court order," not the
only ground for a modification.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.2

(6) (1953 as amended) (emphasis added).

The trial court can

modify an existing order if it finds a material change of
circumstances independent of the impact of the guidelines.3

3

That the legislature intended to allow the trial
court a means independent of the 25% difference to find a
substantial change in circumstances is made obvious by
reference to the pre-1990 amendment provision (§ 78-45-7.2
(l)(b)) which was replaced by § 78-45-7.2 (6). Utah Code
Ann. § 78-45-7.2, amendment notes (wrongly stating that §
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Id.

Because the trial court improperly cited § 78-45-7.2

(6) for its conclusion and failed to consider the
appropriate factors to determine the retroactivity of its
child support order, this court should draw its own legal
conclusions from the stipulated facts. Whitehead v.
Whitehead. 836 P.2d 814 (Utah App. 1992); Smith v. Smith.
793 P.2d 407, 409 (Utah App. 1990).

C. Proper Interpretation of the Stipulated Facts Indicate
that Mr. Blaine,s Child Support Obligation to Allison Should
Be Retroactive to April 22, 1991.
Inappropriately applying Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.2 (6)
(1953 as amended) to the issue of retroactivity, the trial
court ignored that the parties stipulated that three (3)
factors, unrelated to the impact of the guidelines, were
sufficient to establish a substantial change in circumstances for the purposes of modification of Mr. Blaine's
child support obligations.

Because two of these factors

were in existence on the date Mr. Blaine was served with the

78-45-7.2 (l)(b) was replaced by § 78-45-7.2 (5)). The pre1990 provision concludes that although the impact of the *
guidelines on existing child support orders did not
constitute a substantial change in circumstances, "if the
court finds a material change of circumstances independent
of the guidelines," a modification is appropriate. Id.
Thus, the 25% rule of thumb was meant to amend the pre-1990
reference to the impact of the guidelines, not to displace
an independent finding of changed circumstances.
20

petition, the increase in his child support obligation
should be made retroactive to the date of that service —
April 22, 1991.
The parties agreed that three factors contributed to a
change in their circumstances, substantial enough to warrant
a modification of their divorce decree.

These factors were:

(1) a large increase in Mr. Blaine's salary, (2) a decrease
in Ms. Bradshaw's salary and (3) an increase in the cost of
caring for Allison.

On April 22, 1991, the date Mr. Blaine

received notice of Ms. Bradshaw's petition, two of these
factors contributed to a substantial change in
circumstances.

Mr. Blaine was earning two thousand eight

hundred fifty-two dollars ($2,852.00) per month, more than
double the maximum one thousand two hundred and fifty dollar
($1,250.00) monthly income anticipated by the divorce
decree.

In addition, the cost of caring for Allison was

increasing —

she was older and inflation was causing the

general cost of living to rise.
These factors alone —

independent of the impact of the

guidelines upon Mr. Blaine's child support obligations —
constituted a legally sufficient change in circumstances to
warrant modification of the existing order.

Accordingly,

the child support increase should be made retroactive to
April 22, 1991. Only such an order would properly consider
21

"*not only the needs of the child[]f but also the ability of
the parents to pay,"1 Ostler v. Ostler, 789 P.2d at 715,
(quoting

Woodward v. Woodward. 709 P.2d 393, 394 (Utah

1985)), and properly assure that Allison's "standard of
living [is] comparable to that which [she] would have
experienced if no divorce had occurred."

Peterson v.

Peterson, 784 P.2d 593, 596 (Utah App. 1988); Ostler, supra
at 716.

II. Ms. Bradshaw, as the Custodial Parent, Should Be Award
the Tax Dependency Exemption for Allison.
The trial court also erred when it refused to alter the
portion of the existing decree which awards Mr. Blaine the
tax dependency exemption for Allison.

Although the trial

court concluded that there was a sufficient change in
circumstances to warrant a modification of the parties'
support obligations, the trial court provided no findings or
justification for its decision not to transfer the tax
exemption to Ms. Bradshaw, the custodial parent.

In

addition, the trial court failed to address the factors
specified by this court under Motes v. Motes, 786 P.2d 232
(Utah App. 1989) before it refused to grant the tax
exemption to the custodial parent.

Because of the

inadequacy of the findings below and given the stipulated
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facts, this court should reverse the trial court order and
award to Ms. Bradshaw the tax exemption for Allison.

A. Given the Parties7 Substantially Changed Circumstances,
the Trial Court Must Make Appropriate Findings Before it
Refuses to Transfer the Tax Exemption to the Custodial
Parent.
In the presence of a material change in circumstances,
the trial court must make adequate findings before it can
decline to modify an existing award of a tax exemption.
This Court recently held that failure to follow the
statutory child support guidelines absent findings of
special circumstances is reversible error.

Hill v. Hill,

841 P.2d at 724. Because the trial court recalculated the
parties' child support obligations in light of changed
circumstances, its subsequent decision must either conform
to the guidelines or be justified by adequate findings.
However, the trial court departed from the guidelines
without justifying the departure.
Importantly, Utah's child support guidelines assume
that the custodial parent is awarded the tax dependency
exemption.4

Since 1984, when Congress amended the tax code

4

According to the Utah Child Support Task Force,
Report On Proposed Child Support Guidelines, May 1988 (p. 6,
5 I, E.), "The basic child support figures are further
adjusted reflecting the assumption that the custodial parent
would receive the exemptions for all children. If the
23

regarding exemption allowance in divorce, the custodial
parent has been automatically entitled to the available
dependency exemptions unless he/she signs a written declaration otherwise.

26 U.S.C. § 152(e)(2)(A) (1988); Motes v.

Motes, 786 P.2d at 235-36 (recognizing a presumption created
by federal law that the custodial parent receive the exemption) . Indeed, in Fullmer v. Fullmer, 761 P.2d 942, 950
(Utah App. 1988), this Court insisted that it did not have
the authority to grant an exemption contrary to the
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.

Thus, only when

the best interests of the child so requires, will the courts
order a custodial parent to sign a declaration of waiver
consistent with § 152 of tax code.5 Allred v. Allred, 835
P.2d at 978.

Finally, fairness requires that the guidelines

be assumed to vest the tax exemption in the custodial
parent.

Realistically, the custodial parent is often faced

with expenses beyond those which are contemplated and
calculated by the guidelines on the basis of income alone.
Indeed, any expenses which go beyond those anticipated by

custodial parent relinquishes the exemptions, this could be
grounds for an adjustment in the basic award."
5

N.B.: Neither the original decree herein (Exhibit
"E") nor the order of modification (Exhibit "C") order the
defendant custodial parent to annually execute and deliver
the necessary I.R.S. required document.
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the guidelines must be met by the custodial parent alone and
can only be offset by awarding the tax exemption to the
custodial parent.

In combination, each of the

considerations —

federal law, judicial interpretation and

policy concerns —

establish that the guidelines presume

that the tax exemption is awarded to the custodial parent.
Several other factors mandate that the trial court
satisfactorily justify its decision not to award tax
exemptions to the custodial parent.

Recently, this Court

specified two elements to be considered before a court will
order the custodial parent to waive her tax exemption:
First, the noncustodial parent must have a higher
income and provide the majority of support for the
child. Second, the trial court must, from its
findings, determine that by transferring the
dependency exemption to the noncustodial parent .
. [it is] in the best interest of the child, which
in all but exceptional circumstances would
translate into an increased support level for the
child.
Allred v. Allred, 835 P.2d at 978. Without findings and
explanation as to these requirements,6 the trial court
cannot properly determine whether to modify an existing
award of the tax exemption to the noncustodial parent.

6

The non-custodial parent herein, Mr. Blaine was
ordered in the modification to pay only the amount required
under the guidelines.
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Alternatively, if the trial court orders that the
custodial parent give up the tax exemption, it must also
justify this decision.

As established in Allred, the trial

court must, in such cases, "consider whether the best
interests of the child require[] an increase in child
support to reflect the reduction in the tax burden of [the
noncustodial parent]."

Allred v. Allred, 835 P.2d at 978,

n.l.
Finally, adequate findings are particularly necessary
to proper resolution of this case. As was true in Fullmer,
761 P.2d 942, this case does not involve an order directing
that Ms. Bradshaw, as the custodial parent, give up her
right to claim Allison as her dependent.

See,

Motes v.

Motes, 786 P.2d at 234. Therefore, under the Fullmer
doctrine, the trial court does not have the power to "grant
the exemption contrary to the provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code."

Fullmer, 761 P.2d at 950.

If the trial

court wishes to order Ms. Bradshaw to annually execute and
deliver the necessary document to waive her right to claim
Allison as a dependent, then proper findings by the trial
court justifying this action are especially appropriate.
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B. Because of a Lack of Findings and Stipulated Facts
Below, this Court Should Award to Ms. Bradshaw, as the
Custodial Parent, the Right to Claim the Tax Dependency
Exemption for Allison.
Because the trial court failed to adequately consider
the appropriate factors necessary to rebut the presumption
that the custodial parent is entitled to any available tax
dependency exemptions, its decision should be vacated.

In

addition, because the trial court's decision was based on
stipulated facts, this court should draw its own legal
conclusions on the basis of these facts. Whitehead v.
Whitehead. 836 P.2d 814 (Utah App. 1992); Smith v. Smith.
793 P.2d 407, 409 (Utah App. 1990).
Under Motes. two requirements must be met before a
court can award a tax exemption to the noncustodial parent.
First, the noncustodial parent must have a higher income and
provide the majority of support for the child.

Motes, 835

P.2d at 978. Although Mr. Blaine's contribution to Allison's support is 76% of the guideline total, this number
alone cannot prove that Mr. Blaine provides a majority of
the support for Allison.

Given that the guidelines assume

that the custodial parent is entitled to the tax exemption,
referring to the guidelines to establish whether the
noncustodial parent is entitled to the exemption would beg
the question.

Such reasoning would essentially allow the
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court to derive the allocation of the tax exemption from
guidelines which already assume the allocation of the
exemption.7
Finally, and more clearly, Allison's best interests
would be best served by allocating the tax dependency
exemption to her custodial parent.

As determined in Motes,

in all but rare circumstances, the transfer of the
dependency exemption to the noncustodial parent should be
accompanied by "an increased support level for the child."
Motes at 978. Yet, in this case, Mr. Blaine has been
ordered to pay only the amount specified by the support
guidelines and nothing more.

Under Motes and absent any

particular findings, Allison's best interests are not served
by the present arrangement.

Accordingly, this Court should,

consistent with Motes, award the tax dependency exemption to
Ms. Bradshaw as custodian of Allison.

7

Alternatively, if the guidelines do not embody an
assumption about allocation of the tax exemption, to refer
to them to establish the allocation would also be inappropriate. Unless it is assumed that the guidelines award the
tax exemption to the custodial parent, the statute would
unfairly burden the custodial parent with the added expense
of providing for the child's needs which could not be
anticipated by basing child support on income alone without
compensating the custodian for these expenses by awarding
her the tax exemption.
28

CONCLUSION
This Court should determine that because it failed to
make adequate findings (and lacked suitable factual
determinations to support the required findings) and based
its conclusion upon an ill-founded reading of Ut. Code Ann.
§ 78-45-7.2 (6), the trial court erred when it refused to
make Mr. Blaine's increased child support obligation
retroactive to April 22, 1991.

In light of the substantial

change in circumstances which had occurred before April 22,
1991, this Court should conclude that consideration of
Allison's best interests and the ability of her parents to
meet their support obligations requires that the increase be
retroactive to the date upon which Mr. Blaine was served
with the Ms. Bradshaw's petition.
This Court should also determine that, in this case,
before a court can order Ms. Bradshaw to waive her right to
claim Allison as a dependent for tax purposes, it must make
the appropriate findings under Allred.

In addition, this

Court should hold that if sufficient grounds exist to allow
a trial court to modify an existing child support amount to
conform with the statutory guidelines, those same grounds
mandate the reconsideration of an order allowing the noncustodial parent to claim a child as a dependent for the
purposes of a tax exemption.

Finally, this Court should
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determine that Ms. Bradshaw is entitled to claim an
exemption for Allison on her taxes.

Because Mr. Blaine's

support obligation is based upon the statutory guidelines
which presume that the custodial parent is entitled to the
tax exemption and there has been no showing that his
obligation has been increased beyond the guidelines to
account for the tax benefit he will receive, Allison's best
interests are served by allowing her custodial parent to
claim the exemption.
The decision of the trial court as to these two issues
is manifestly in error and should be vacated.

This Court

should direct the trial court to enter an order requiring
that Mr. Blaine's increased child support obligation be
retroactive to April 22, 1991 to the amount of two hundred
ninety-five dollars ($295.00)>per month, (Findings, 5 10 at
4, Exhibit "B" attached), and that Allison's best interests
will be served by awarding Ms. Bradshaw, as her custodian,
the tax dependency exemption commencing in 1992.
DATED this 8th day of MARCH, 1993.

Attorney for Defendant
and Appellant
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EXHIBITS
("A")

Petition to Modify Decree, April 22, 1991.

("AA") Supplemental Petition to Modify,
May 19, 1992.
("B")

Amended Findings of Fact &
Conclusions of Law, October 21, 1992.

("C")

Order and Judgment, October 19, 1992.

("D")

Notice of Appeal, October 30, 1992.

("E")

Original Decree of Divorce, May 1, 1986.
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12 00 Kennecott Building
10 East South Temple Street
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BRIAN M. BARNARD
USB # 0215
JOHN PACE
USB #5624
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
Attorneys for Defendant
214 East Fifth South
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111-3204
Phone: (801) 328-9531 or 328-9532
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY

STATE OF UTAH

:

PETITION TO MODIFY
DECREE

:

Civil No. 86-4900291

:

(Hon. Leonard H. Russon)

DAVID B1AINE,
Plaintiff,
vs.
PAMELA BRADSHAW BLAINE,
Defendant.

t

The defendant by and through counsel petitions and
moves this court as follows:
1.

The parties were divorced pursuant to a decree

entered herein on May 2, 1986.
2.

Since the entry of the decree there has been

significant changes in the circumstances of the parties.
The plaintiff has moved to the state of New York and is
earning substantially more now than he was at the time the
decree was entered.

The cost of raising children has

substantially increased since 1986.

3.

The Utah Legislature has set specific child support

guidelines which detail the child support obligations and
requirements to be adequate for the care and maintenance of
children.
4. It is reasonable, proper and necessary that the
decree herein be modified so that the plaintiff's child
support obligation and all of the terms relative to the care
of the children be modified to comply with the current
statutory guidelines.
5.

It is reasonable, proper and necessary that the

plaintiff be required to maintain a life insurance policy on
his life in the sum of at least $100,000.00 (One Hundred
Thousand Dollars) naming the minor children of the parties
as beneficiaries during their minority and designating,the
defendant as the trustee to administer the proceeds for
those policies.
WHEREFORE, the plaintiff demands that the decree be
modified in conformance with the foregoing petition.
DATED t h i s / ^ y

day of APRIL, 1991,
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
Attorneys for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and
correct copy of the foregoing PETITION TO MODIFY DECREE to:
HARRY CASTON
MCKAY, BURTON & THURMAN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
1200 Kennecott Building
10 East South Temple Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
on the ^>ly day of APRIL, 1991, postage prepaid in the
United States Postal Service.
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
Attorneys for Defendant

BRIAN M. BARNARD
USB # 0215
JOHN PACE
USB #5624
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
Attorneys for Defendant
214 East Fifth South
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111-3204
Phone: (801) 328-9531 or 328-9532
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

DAVID BLAINE,
:

SUPPLEMENTAL PETITION
TO MODIFY

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. 86-4900291

PAMELA BRADSHAW BLAINE,
:

(Hon. A. Stirba)

Defendant•

The defendant Pamela Bradshaw (Blaine) by and through
her counsel as a supplement to the pending petition for
modification in the above matter presents this supplemental
petition and hereby specifically requests that the defendant
be allowed to claim the minor child of the parties as a
dependant for income tax purposes in addition to the relief
sought in her prior and pending petition for modification.
DATED this

day of MAY, 1992.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and
correct copy of the foregoing SUPPLEMENTAL PETITION TO
MODIFY to:
HARRY CASTON
Attorney for Plaintiff
MCKAY, BURTON & THURMAN
1200 Kennecott Building
10 South Temple Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
on the/2j2§5 day of MAY, 1992, postage prepaid in the United
States Postal Service.
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BRIAN M. BARNARD
USB # 0215
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
Attorneys for Defendant
214 East Fifth South
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111-3204
Phone: (801) 328-9531 or 328-9532
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY

STATE OF UTAH

DAVID BLAINE,
:
Plaintiff,

AMENDED
FINDINGS OF FACT and
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.
Civil No. 86-4900291
PAMELA BRADSHAW (BLAINE),

:
(Hon. Anne Stirba)

Defendant.

THE ABOVE CAPTIONED MATTER having come before the court
for trial on defendant's Petition to Modify, the Hon* Anne
Stirba, judge presiding, the hearing being held on September
3, 1992 at 9:30 a.m., plaintiff appearing in person and by
and through counsel, Harry Caston, defendant appearing in
person and by and through counsel, Brian M. Barnard, the
parties having stipulated to the settlement of several
issues, and then having submitted the remaining matters to
the Court as legal issues, and the Court having on Friday,
October 9, 1992 at 10:00 a.m. discussed with counsel the
contents and terms of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions

of Law to be entered herein and having made some amendments
thereto, based thereon and for good cause appearing, the
Court hereby makes and enters the following

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The parties were divorced in 1986 when plaintiff

was a full time college student and his income was less than
eight hundred dollars (<$800.00) per month.

Defendant was

employed full time as a teacher at that time.
2.

Since the divorce the plaintiff has completed his

college education and is now employed full time by IBM in
New York State earning three thousand eighty-one dollars
($3,081.00) per month.
3.

Defendant currently earns one thousand sixty-five

dollars ($1,065.00) per month working half time as a public
school teacher.
4.

The child of the parties was three (3) years old

when the divorce occurred and is now nine (9) years of age.
The cost of caring for a nine year old child today is
greater than for caring for a three year old child six years
ago.
5.

The original decree entered May 2, 1986 provided

that plaintiff would pay a maximum of two hundred and fifty
2

dollars ($250.00) per month in child support when his income
exceeded one thousand two hundred and fifty dollars
($1,250.00+) per month.

The original decree had provisions

for escalation of child support as plaintiff's income
increased, but contained no provision for escalation after
plaintiff's income substantially exceeded one thousand two
hundred and fifty dollars ($1,250.00) per month.
6.

The original decree provided that for the years

1986 - 1989 inclusive the defendant could claim the child as
a dependent and receive an exemption for income tax
purposes.

The original decree and existing order provided

that for the year 1990 and each year thereafter the
plaintiff could claim the child as a dependent and receive
an exemption for income tax purposes.

When the decree was

entered the parties anticipated that in 1990 the plaintiff
would be earning more than the defendant and that at that
time he would have greater use for the dependency/exemption
claim of the child.
7.

The original decree made no provision for life

insurance on either parties' life for the benefit of the
child.

The parties stipulated and agreed that the decree

should be modified to require each party to maintain life
insurance coverage on their own life in the sum of at least
3

one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000.00) naming the minor
child as beneficiary during her minority naming the other
party as trustee of those proceeds.
8.

Plaintiff was served with the petition for

modification on April 22, 1991.
9.

In April, 1991 plaintiff was earning only two

thousand eight hundred fifty-two dollars ($2,852.00) gross
monthly salary working for IBM.

In April, 1991 defendant

was earning one thousand eight hundred seventy-three dollars
($1,873.00) gross per month working full-time as a school
teacher.
10.

Under the statutory support guidelines, in April,

1991, plaintiff's child support obligation to the defendant,
if then re-calculated, would have been two hundred ninetyfive dollars ($295.00) per month.

Said sum represents less

than a twenty-five percent (<25%) increase in plaintiff's
support obligation under the guidelines from the existing
court order ($250.00) in effect in April 1991.
11.

On or about October 15, 1991, the plaintiff

received an increase in his monthly gross income and since
that date has been earning three thousand eighty-one dollars
($3,081.00) gross per month.
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12.

Plaintiff has accumulated arrears ($2,350.00) in

child support based upon his non-payment as agreed to by the
parties between August, 1989 and December 1991 inclusive, of
the full amount ($250.) as required by the decree. That
amount ($2,350.00) should be off-set against the equitable
lien ($2,217.00) plaintiff had against the former marital
home of the parties. Thus, there is a net balance due
defendant from plaintiff for the sum of one hundred thirtythree dollars ($133.) representing the accumulated arrears
less the equitable lien.
should be extinguished.

The plaintiff's equitable lien
Plaintiff no longer has any claim

or interest in the real property known as:
Lots 1 and 2, Block 2, HOMESITE
ADDITION, according to the official plat
thereof, recorded in Book "F" of Plats
at page 101 of the records of the Salt
Lake County Recorder, State of Utah,
located in Salt Lake County, Utah and commonly known as:
555 East 2700 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84106.
Defendant should be granted a judgment against plaintiff in
the sum of one hundred thirty-three ($133.00) dollars. With
that judgment plaintiff's child support obligation through
and including August, 1992 as provided for under the
original decree has been satisfied.
13.

Defendant claimed in her Petition to Modify that

there was a substantial change in circumstances which
5

allowed the Court to reconsider and increase child support
as well as to allow the court to re-consider and modify the
decree with regard to which parent could claim the child as
a dependent for income tax purposes. The parties agreed
that there was a substantial change in circumstances which
allowed the Court to reconsider and increase child support.
14.

Other than the foregoing, defendant presented no

evidence to show a change in circumstances of the parties or
to justify increasing child support or altering the award of
the tax dependency exemption allowance.
15.

The parties stipulated that all of the foregoing

facts were true and correct for the purpose of settlement
and for the purpose of presentation to the Court of various
pending legal issues as raised by the pleadings on file.
16.

The defendant incurred court costs in the pursuit

of her petition to modify.

BASED UPON THE FOREGOING and for good cause appearing,
the Court makes and enters the following

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The court has subject matter jurisdiction and

personal jurisdiction over the parties.
6

2.

The plaintiff's child support obligation'should be

increased in light of a legally sufficient substantial
change in circumstances set forth in the findings of fact.
3.

The substantial change in circumstances of the

parties set forth above justifies modification of
plaintiff's child support obligation.

Under the statutory

guidelines based upon the parties' current incomes and
incomes as of October 15, 1991, plaintiff's child support
obligation has increased by more than twenty-five per cent
(>25%) over his obligation provided in the existing order.
Pursuant to Ut. Code Ann. § 78-45-7.2 (6) (1953 as amended)
in light of that twenty-five percent (>25%) increase, the
plaintiff's child support obligation should be increased to
the sum of three hundred twenty-two dollars ($322.00) per
month.
4.

The increased child support set forth in the

foregoing paragraphs is in conformance with and is based
upon the statutory guidelines, Ut. Code Ann. § 78-45-7.14
(1953 as amended).

The sum of three hundred and twenty-two

dollars ($322.00) per month is the exact amount provided
under said guidelines.

Under the guidelines said sum

($322.00) represents seventy-six (76%) of the necessary
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support amount established by the guidelines based upon the
combined incomes of the parties.
5.

Because the increase in plaintiff's salary to three

thousand eighty-one dollars ($3,081*00) gross per month
occurred on October 15, 1991, the increase in plaintiff's
child support obligation should be retroactive, pursuant to
Ut. Code Ann. § 30-3-10.6 (2) (1953 as amended), only to
October 15, 1991.
6.

The child support shall not be retroactive to when

the plaintiff was served with the Petition for Modification
(April 22, 1991) because as of that date based upon the
parties' respective incomes at that time the increase in
child support under the guidelines was less than one hundred
twenty-five percent (<125%) of plaintiff's support
obligation under the existing order.

A substantial change

of circumstances for the purpose of increasing child support
does not occur unless there is an increase of at least
twenty-five percent (25%) from the existing court ordered
amount to the proposed new increased amount of support. Ut.
Code Ann. § 78-45-7.2 (6) (1953 as amended). •> Based upon the
foregoing, the increase in child support should not be
retroactive to April 22, 1991, but only to October 15, 1991.
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7.

Plaintiff owes to defendant ten (10) months at

$72.00 per month (November, 1991 - through August, 1992
inclusive) plus $36.00 for one/half of the month of October,
1991 for a total of seven hundred fifty-six dollars
($756.00) as a result of the retroactive effect of the child
support increase.

Defendant should be granted a judgment

for that amount against plaintiff.
8.

There has not been a substantial change in circum-

stances of the parties sufficient to warrant altering the
portion of the existing decree which awards to plaintiff the
right to claim the minor child of the parties as a dependent
and thus claim an exemption for income tax purposes.
9.

Based upon the stipulation of the parties, each

party should be ordered to secure and maintain one hundred
thousand dollars ($100,000.00) in life insurance on their
respective lives, naming the minor child as the beneficiary
during her minority naming the other party as trustee of
those proceeds.
10.

Plaintiff's accumulated arrears ($2,350.00) in

child support should be" off-set against the equitable lien
($2,217.00) plaintiff has against the former marital home of
the parties.

Thus, there is a net balance due defendant

from plaintiff for the sum of one hundred thirty-three
9

dollars ($133.00) representing the difference between the
accumulated arrears and plaintiff's equitable lien.
Plaintiff's equitable lien should be extinguished.
Plaintiff shall no longer have any lien, claim or interest
in the real property known as:
Lots 1 and 2, Block 2, HOMESITE ADDITION, according to the official plat
thereof, recorded in Book flF", of Plats
at page 101, records of the Salt Lake
County Recorder, State of Utah,
located in Salt Lake County, Utah and commonly known as:
555 East 2700 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84106.
Defendant should be granted a judgment against plaintiff in
the net sum of one hundred thirty-three ($133.00) dollars,
thereupon plaintiff's child support obligation through and
including August, 1992 as provided for under the original
decree will be satisfied.
11.

Defendant is entitled to an award of her costs

pursuant to Rule 54 (d)(1), Ut.R.Civ.Pro.
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12.

An order and judgment should be entered in

conformance with the foregoing amended findings and
conclusions.
DATED this L\ ~~ day of OCTOBER, 1992.
BY THE COURT:

JUDGE
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on the 9th day of October, 1992, postage prepaid in the
United States Postal Service.
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
Attorneys for Defendant

diva\hlrj\bradfin3 .mod \ b l t l b
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BRIAN M. BARNARD
USB # 0215
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
Attorneys for Defendant
214 East Fifth South
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111-3204
Phone: (801) 328-9531 or 328-9532
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY

STATE OF UTAH

DAVID BLAINE,
:

ORDER AND JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.

:

PAMELA BRADSHAW (BLAINE),

:

Civil No. 86-4900291
(Hon. Anne Stirba)
Defendant.

:

THE ABOVE CAPTIONED MATTER having come before the court
for trial on defendant's Petition to Modify, the Hon. Anne
Stirba, judge presiding, the hearing being held on September
3, 1992 at 9:30 a.m., plaintiff appearing in person and by
and through counsel, Harry Caston, defendant appearing in
person and by and through counsel, Brian M. Barnard, the
parties having stipulated to the settlement of several
issues, and then having submitted the remaining matters to
the Court as legal issues, the Court having previously made

1

and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
based thereon and for good cause appearing,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED:

1.

The plaintiff's child support obligation is

increased in light of a legally sufficient substantial
change in circumstances set forth in the findings of fact.
2.

The plaintiff's child support obligation is

increased to the sum of three hundred twenty-two dollars
($322.00) per month.
3.

The increase in plaintiff's child support obli-

gation is retroactive, pursuant to Ut. Code Ann. § 30-3-10.6
(2) (1953 as amended) to October 15, 1991. As a result of
the retroactive effect of the child support increase,
defendant is granted a judgment against plaintiff for the
sum of ($756.00) seven hundred fifty-six dollars.
4.

The request of defendant to make the increased

child support retroactive to when the plaintiff was served
with the Petition for Modification (April 22, 1991) is
denied.
5.

The request of defendant to alter the portion of

the existing decree which awards to plaintiff the right to
2

claim the minor child of the parties as a dependent and thus
claim an exemption for income tax purposes is denied.
6.

Each party is ordered to secure and maintain one

hundred thousand dollars ($100,000.00) in life insurance on
their respective lives, naming the minor child as the
beneficiary during her minority naming the other party as
trustee of those proceeds.
7.

Plaintiff's accumulated arrears ($2,350.00) in

child support is off-set against the equitable lien
($2,217.00) plaintiff has against the former marital home of
the parties.

Plaintiff's equitable lien is extinguished.

Plaintiff no longer has any lien, claim or interest in the
real property known as:
Lots 1 and 2, Block 2, HOMESITE ADDITION, according to the official plat
thereof, recorded in Book "F", of Plats
at page 101, records of the Salt Lake
County Recorder, State of Utah,
located in Salt Lake County, Utah and commonly known as:
555 East 2700 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84106.
Defendant is granted a judgment against plaintiff in the net
sum of one hundred thirty-three ($133.00) dollars, whereupon
plaintiff's child support obligation through and including
August, 1992 as provided for under the original decree is
found to be satisfied.

3

12.

Defendant is awarded her costs pursuant to Rule 54

(d)(1), Ut.R.Civ.Pro. in the sum of fifty-six dollars
($56.00).
DATED this ( f-^* day of October, 1992.
BY THE COURT:

hi
ANNE /STIHBA
/STIHBA
JUDGE
'
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a correct
copy of the foregoing ORDER AND JUDGMENT to:
HARRY CASTON
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
12 00 Kennecott Building
10 East South Temple Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
on the 10th day of September, 1992, on the 1st day of
October, and on the 9th day of October, 1992 postage prepaid
in the United States Postal Service and by fax on October 9,
1992.
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
Attorneys for Defendant

diva\hlrj\bradfin3 .mod \ b m b
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BRIAN M. BARNARD
USB # 0215
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
Attorneys for Defendant
214 East Fifth South
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111-3204
Phone: (801) 328-9531 or 328-9532
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY

STATE OF UTAH

DAVID BLAINE,
;

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Plaintiff,
vs.

:

PAMELA BRADSHAW (BLAINE),

!

Civil No. 86-4900291
(Hon. Anne Stirba)
Defendant.

:

THE DEFENDANT by and through counsel, Brian M. Barnard
hereby gives notice of her appeal in the above captioned
matter of the decision, ruling and order of the Court
entered as a result of the hearing September 3, 1992 at 9:30
a.nu, denying to defendant certain relief requested in
plaintiff's petitions for modification, to-wit:
(a)

Denying the request of defendant to make the

increased child support retroactive to when the plaintiff
was served with the Petition for Modification (April 22,
1991); and,

(b)

Denying the request of defendant to alter the

portion of the existing decree which awards to plaintiff the
right to claim the minor child of the parties as a dependent
and thus claim an exemption for income tax purposes is
denied.
Said rulings are embodied in Amended Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law and an Order and Judgment dated
October 21st, 1992 and October 19, 1992 respectively.
This appeal is to the Utah Court of Appeals.
DATED this 30th day of October, 1992.
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
Attorneys for Defendant

2

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a correct
copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL to:
HARRY CASTON
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
1200 Kennecott Building
10 East South Temple Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
on the 30th day of October, 1992, postage prepaid in the
United States Postal Service.
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
Attorneys for Defendant

diva\hlrj\bradappe.not\bmb
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LAURA L. BOYER - 3767
Attorney for Plaintiff
3167 West 4700 South
West Valley City, Utah 84118
Telephone:
(801) 964-6100 j
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DAVID BLAINE,
DECREE OF DIVORCE
Plaintiff,
vs

Civil No- D86-291

PAMELA BRADSHAW BLAINE
Judge Leonard H. Russon
Defendant.
ooOOoo
THIS

MATTER

on

came

regularly

above court, sitting without

to

a jury, the

be heard
Honorable

Russon, presiding, this

1st day of May, 1986,

present

represented

Boyer.
entered

in
The

court,

and

defendant

evidence

entered

not

his

appear,

its

and

has been

reviewed

Findings

of

entered.

all
Fact

counsel,

but

Leonard

H.

having

Laura

L.

previously

Stipulation

filed

The court, having heard

pleadings
and

the

The plaintiff was

her Entry of Appearance, Waiver, and

herein, her default
the

did

by

before

on

file

Conclusions

of

herein,
Law,

it

and
is

hereby:
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

That the plaintiff

is granted a Decree of Divorce,

the same to become final and absolute upon entry.
2.

CHILD

CUSTODY, VISITATION, SUPPORT:

During

their

EXHIBIT

marriage

one

ALLISON

(1)

BLAINE,

awarded

her

(24)

hours

plaintiff

said

the following:
Wednesday,
night

and

per

Eve

Allison's

Birthday;
party

before

the

child support
($125.00)

when

fifty

dollars

support

shall

be two

Plaintiff

preceding

each

thousand
shall
shall

be

least

out

week

of

visits,

rights

of

limited

to,

Monday,

Tuesday,

one

between

the

twenty-four

his

night;

25

at

11:00

other

day

and

Saturday

and

outside

a.m.;

holidays,

Salt

Lake

is

to

1986, and each alternating

ordered
each

to

pay

month,

child

necessity

income

hundred

support

of

the

thirty-three

defendant

summer

exercise

one

24,

Said

hundred

one

is

day

(without

and

wit:

1/2

day

and,

County,

year,
on

in

the

one

(1)

(or two (2) two week periods, split u p ) .

month.

plaintiff's

above

to

to

subject

at

to

increases

dollars

two

hundred

two

supply

hundred

defendant

dollars

if

between
thousand
per

dollars

fifty

two

month,

with

Form

the
and,

($1,250.00)

dollars

and

eight

($200.00) per month;

fifty

or

automatically

one

income

on

permanent

intervention)

to

gross

dollars

shall

follows:

($833.00)

($1,250.00)
hundred

court
as

and

twenty-five

support

of

defendant,

temporary

in the amount of One hundred

per

escalate

control,

week

alternating

Plaintiff
first

The

per

December

continual summer month
3.

with

resides

1983.

parties;

to include, but not be

(2) days

through

the

to defendant
intent

December

to

visitation

to alternate

Christmas

either

his

Thursday,

ffjfidayj beginning

event

of

visitations

weekend,

14,
and

gives

of

two

born

February

rights

notice

visitation,

been

custody,

liberal

the

has

born

care,

plaintiff's
provided

child

the

($250.00).

1040, by May

1, of

following year as proof of income.
4.

Plaintiff's

child

support

obligation

nue until said child reaches age eighteen

should

conti-

(18) or until the end

of the school year in which she has reached the age of eighteen
(18),

provided

that

it

should

terminate

at an earlier

age, if

the child has become otherwise emancipated, or at a later age if
the

child

remains

dependent

by

reason

of

physical

or

mental

disease or defect.
5.
srd§FSd

MEDICAL

to maintain

INSURANCE

AND

EXPENSES:

Defendant

coverage for the said child of the

under

a policy

of major

child

is within

the age

same

becomes

medical

insurance

limits allowed

unavailable

to

for

so

she

parties

long as the

by the policy.

defendant,

is

If the

should

provide

plaintiff with notice thereof.
6.

Each party is ordered to pay one-half (1/2) of all

medical, dental orthodontic, and optical

expenses which are not

covered by insurance necessarily incurred for their minor child.
7.

ALIMONY:

8.

HOME:

Neither party is awarded alimony.
The real

property of the parties, situated

at 555 East 2700 South, Salt Lake City, State of Utah is awarded
to

the

defendant.

Plaintiff

is ordered

to

sign

a

quit-claim

deed conveying the above-described property to defendant
to

a

lien

in

the

amount

of

Two

Thousand

Two

Hundred

Seventeen Dollars ( $ 2 , 2 1 7 . 0 0 ) , and subject to defendant
all

known

liabilities

on

this

property,

subject

holding

and

assuming
plaintiff

harmless for any liability thereon.
9.

Said aforementioned

lien is ordered to be paid by

defendant

to

plaintiff

c o n d i t i o n s to o c c u r : rental

or

upon

the

sale

of

(10) y e a r s after d i v o r c e d e c r e e entered
10.

ASSETS:

first
the

furniture,

which have

been

fixtures,

equitably

following

or w i t h i n

ten

herein.
the

parties

furnishings

divided

the

home;

During their m a r r i a g e

household

of

between

and

acquired
appliances

themselves

and

which

are awarded pursuant to this d i v i s i o n .
11.

Each p a r t y is awarded his or her p e r s o n a l e f f e c t s .

12.

DEBTS

AND

OBLIGATIONS:

a s s u m e and pay all o b l i g a i o n s

Each

incurred

party

by him

is ordered

or

her

after

to
the

s e p a r a t i o n of the p a r t i e s .
13.

TAXES:

Defendant

is

child as d e p e n d e n c y e x m p t i o n s for
including

1989.

Plaintiff

entitled

follows:
1983

VEHICLES:

liabilities

the

is entitled

up

minor
to

to claim the minor
1990 and

and

child

beyond.

The vehicles of the p a r t i e s are awaded as

to p l a i n t i f f ,

Subaru

claim

income tax p u r p o s e s

of the p a r t i e s as d e p e n d e n c y e x e m p t i o n from
14.

to

the

1977

GL,

subject

to

thereon

and

holding

Subaru

her

GF;

to

assuming
plaintiff

defendant,

and

paying

harmless

for

the
the
any

1iability t h e r e o n .
15.
assume
herein.

and

ATTORNEY'S
pay

his

FEES AND C O S T S :
own

attorney's

Plaintiff
fees

and

is ordered
costs

to

incurred

16.
duly execute

DOCUMENTS

AND LOCATION:

and deliver

all documents

Each

party

is ordered to

necessary

to effect the

Decree of Divorce.
DATED

, 1986.
BY THE

s^j.—£~/^J

(Leonard H. Russon, JXTdge

ATTEST
tf. DIXON HINDLEY
C§rfc

^D&IuiyCtork

MAILING

CERTIFICATE

I
foregoing
Defendan
555 East
of April,

hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
Decree of Divorce were mailed, postage prepaid, to the
PAMELA BRADSHAW BLAINE, at her last known address of
2700 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 on the <? day
1986.

•4^.
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